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DIGEST NOTE.
PATENTS-FIXING OF RESALE PRICES-AGAIN IN-
VALIDATED.
H eld that a "license notice," attached to a patented article and
fixing the price below which the article cannot be resold, or used
when so resold, without rendering the purchaser and user liable to
an action for "infringement" of the patent, is illegal and void as a
restraint upon alienation.-Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.
decided April 9, 1917, by the Supreme Court of the United States
(opinion of Mr. Justice Clarke).
This decision marks the ultimate failure of the most pertinacious
attempt to maintain uniform resale prices by virtue of patent rights
that has yet been made. In Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair
(1903, 7th C. C. A.' 123 Fed. 424, the Court of Appeals solemnly
held that it was "infringement" of the patent for the defendant to
cut the "licensed" resale price fixed by the patent owner-vendor,
although the defendant had bought, paid for and owned the machines,
just as it owned the ginghams and buttons in its stock. This ruling
with many others to a like effect was wiped out by Bauer v. O'Donnell
(1913) 229 U. S. 1. But in that case the court distinguished Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 1 (in which it was held by a ma-
jority of four to three justices that the patent owner could sell his
patented machine and at the same time "license" its use only in con-
nection wtih unpatented accessories obtained from the vendor) on
the ground that only a "qualified title" (whatever that may mean)
to the machine passed, whereas in the Bauer case the unqualified title
was conveyed. Thereupon the Victor Company (just two months
after the date of the Bauer case decision) "adroitly modified" the
language and form of its "license notice" in the attempt to make the
right to use the "invention" externalized in the chattel sold, contingent
upon the payment by "the unlicensed public" of the "licensed price."
The court makes no effort to conceal its resentment at this piece
of clumsy indirection. The plaintiff's whole course of conduct indi-
cates that "the scheme was regarded by the plaintiff itself and its
agents simply as one for maintaining prices by holding a patent in-
fringement suit in terrorem over the ignorant and the timid." "It
would be a perversion of terms to call the transaction intended to be
embodied in this system of marketing plaintiff's machines a 'license
to use the invention.'
Inasmuch as the patent right is incorporeal and consists altogether
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in the negative right, by means of infringement suits, to exclude
others from making, using or selling the thing patented, it would seem
incredible that courts should perceive any possible connection between
the patent right and a common law contract of sale. But for near
a quarter of a century the lower Federal Courts have steadfastly up-
held all manner of "license" restrictions in connection with the sale or
lease of patent protected chattels. For over fifty years the Supreme
Court has ruled that the right to make, use and sell is not derived from
or sanctioned by the patent law, see Bauer v. O'Donnell, supra, and
In re Brosnahax (188) 18 Fed. 62 (Mr. Justice Miller). "It is one
of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases
and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis"
(Hyde v. U. S. 1912, 225 U. S. at 391, Mr. Justice Holmes, dissent-
ing )
DIGEST NOTE.
PATENTS-TYING CLAUSE-LICENSE NOTICE INVAL-
IDATED-Iienry v. A. B. Dick Co. (1912), 224 U. S. 1 (the Mimeo-
graph case) overruled.
Held that a notice attached to a patented moving picture machine
whereby the purchaser is obligated (1) to purchase (unpatented)
films for use therewith exclusively from the vendor of the machine
and (2) to perform other conditions subsequently to be nominated by
the vendor, is not sanctioned by the patent law and is illegal and void
as "gravely injurious" to "public interest."-Motion Picture Patents
Company v. Universal Film Mfg Co., April 9, 1917, decided by Su-
preme Court of the United States (opinion by Mr. Justice Clarke).
It is undeniable that this decision is of great importance. The
court might easily have reached the same result by applying Sec. 3
of the Clayton Act, as did the Court of Appeals; it declined so to do
and instead aggressively overruled the Dick case along with its fore-
runner the Button Fastener case (1896, 6th C. C. A.) 77 Fed. 288.
The soundness of the Dick case from the date of its decision has been
questioned (see St. Louis Law Review, Vol. 1, page 203). The rea-
soning in that case, say the court, is unsound,
"from failure to distinguish between the rights which are given
to the inventor by the patent law and which he may assert
against all the world through an infringement proceeding and
rights which he may create for himself by private contract
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which, however, are subject to the rules of general as distin-
guished from those of the patent law." (Italics are mine).
This declaration and the conclusion announced seems an inevit-
able implication of the patent statutes; it is sustained by all authori-
ties (except the Dick case and its like); what is more, an opposite
ruling could not be accommodated to other laws, both Federal and
State.
If a contract pertaining to a patented machine is sanctioned by,
or its legality is to be measured under, the patent statutes, then, it is
obvious that the validity of such contract cannot be measured by the
general law of contracts, including the Federal Anti-Trust Act and
the State Anti-Monopoly Statutes. The Federal Government can only
attack or question the validity of a patent by a bill in equity on the
ground of fraud in its procurement (U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co.,
128 U. S. 315); and the States are powerless to question or attack
a patent in any way or on any ground. R. S. (U. S.), Sec. 4920
enumerates five special defenses pleadable in infringement suits, any-
one of which, if pleaded and proved, will not only defeat the action,
but will also destroy the patent. Walker on Patents (4th Ed.), Sec.
441, enumerates twenty-seven separate defenses pleadable in such
actions, some of which, if sustained will overthrow the patent, and
others of which, will exonerate the defendant. These constitute both
statutory and judicial immunities which Congress and the courts have
conferred upon the public, against the existence of unauthorized and
illegal monpolies. In the Dick case the record showed that the patent
owner had in force 11,000 of the restrictive contracts (1. c. 149 Fed.
at 425); in the Button Fastener case there were 49,000 such con-
tracts (I. c. 77 Fed. at 301). In a suit by the Federal or a State
Government to have these systems of contracts annulled, as illegal
restraints on trade, neither Federal nor State Courts would have
jurisdiction to question the validity of the patents. And for either
court to uphold the contracts by assuming the validity of the patents
would be to "sport away" (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch at 156, the
Chief Justice) these immunities. For "no right can be defeated, in
law, unless the party claiming it, has himself an opportunity to sup-
port it" (Georgia v. Brailsford 1790, 2 Dallas at 407, Jr. Justice
Iredell).
If the assumption were indulged, one who owns a patent (which
when properly tested may be found to be void) could override all
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limitations, both Federal and State, on the right to contract in restraint
of trade.
What is sanctioned by the patent statutes (i. e. the right to bring
infringement suits in the Federal Courts) is not denied by any Anti-
Monopoly Statutes (Federal or State) and, conversely, what is denied
by the latter is not sanctioned by the patent statutes. The patent
statutes authorize the patent owner to attempt the exclusion of com-
petition in the thing patented only by infringement suits; the Anti-
Monopoly Statutes denounce as a crime the exclusion of competition
by contracts. One instrumentality is given and one taken away. To
permit the patent owner, in the name (but not in the exercise) of
the legal instrumentality to substitute therefor and use instead the
criminal instrumentality, would be to sanction juristic counterfeiting.
And that would be (as the court said) "gravely injurious."
F. Y. G.
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